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ABSTRACT Synchrophasor technology has numerous applications ranging from simple grid monitor-
ing/visualization to real-time protection and control. Most legacy phasor measurement units (PMUs) and
phasor data concentrators (PDCs) deployed in power grids support the IEEE C37.118.2 communication
framework, which is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks due to lack of inherent security mechanisms. The IEC
61850-90-5 recently emerged as new communication framework with support for security features but its use
in commercial devices is still very limited. The replacement of legacy PMUs/PDCs in power grids is a big
challenge due to cost and deployment complexity. The concept of a gateway has recently been proposed in the
literature to enable IEEE C37.118.2 compatible PMUs to send data in IEC 61850-90-5 format. However, the
published gateway has limited features and also lacks security functionalities. This paper addresses security,
interoperability, and integration issues between legacy and state-of-the-art phasor devices through the design
of a security gateway. The security gateway is implementedwith flexibility inmind and can be used for PMUs
as well as PDCs under different configurations. It provides: 1) protocol conversion functionalities (from
IEEE C37.118.2 to IEC 61850-90-5 and vice versa) and 2) security functionalities based on IEC recom-
mended group domain of interpretation security mechanism. The security gateway is very compact in size,
based on low-power ARM processor and inexpensive to be deployed in power systems. Through detailed
experimental evaluation with real PMU data, this paper also validated the suitability of the security gateway
for different types of synchrophasor applications with strict latency and data rate requirements.
INDEX TERMS Smart grid, synchrophasors, cyber security, IEEE C37.118.2, IEC 61850-90-5, GDOI.
I. INTRODUCTION
Synchrophasor technology involves measurement of elec-
trical quantities using Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)
at different locations in power grids which ideally will be
transmitted in real-time to the control center. The PMUs
are equipped with a GPS antenna to time-stamp measured
electrical quantities and enable the control center to precisely
process them for real-timeWide-AreaMonitoring, Protection
And Control (WAMPAC) of power grids. Synchrophasor
technology requires an efficient and secure communication
framework to transfer power system dynamics in real-time
over IP network to ensure reliable and trustworthyWAMPAC
operation.
IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 are two well
known synchrophasor communication frameworks [1]. IEEE
C37.118.2 emerged from IEEE C37.118 (developed in 2005)
and has been widely adopted in commercial PMUs and
Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs). However, it has several
gaps e.g., no inherent security mechanism. To harmonize
synchrophasor data transfer with IEC 61850 power utility
automation standard and fulfill gaps of IEEE C37.118.2, IEC
61850-90-5 was introduced in 2012 with a recommended
security mechanism based on Group Domain of Interpreta-
tion (GDOI) [2]. Until now, few commercial phasor devices
support IEC 61850-90-5.
A. PAPER MOTIVATION
This paper addresses two key challenges faced today in
synchrophasor-based systems: (i) interoperability and inte-
gration between legacy and state-of-the-art phasor devices,
and (ii) security of synchrophasor data communication.
Over the last two decades, many power companies have
already deployed hundreds or thousands of PMUs and
PDCs which lack the recent IEC 61850-90-5 communication
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framework [3] and/or the GDOI security mechanism [2].
These legacy devices use different protocol and data represen-
tations, which make interoperability and integration a major
issue. The interoperability constraints make the adaptation
of secure IEC 61850-90-5 in power grids a big challenge.
Upgrading or replacement of legacy PMUs, PDCs and pre-
viously developed IEEE C37.118.2 compatible WAMPAC
applications is not feasible due to the cost and complexity
involved.
Depending on the type of synchrophasor application,
particularly new real-time control applications, a cyber attack
could result in catastrophic consequences for the power
grids. WAMPAC applications based on IEEE C37.118.2 are
highly vulnerable and different types of cyber attacks have
been investigated/demonstrated in literature [4]–[6]. Even
though, GDOI is recommended as a security mechanism
for synchrophasor data communication, most commercial
phasor devices (including many IEC 61850-90-5 compliant
PMUs and PDCs) lack its implementation. Without proper
authentication, encryption and cryptographic signature, IEC
61850-90-5 is as vulnerable to cyber attacks as IEEE
C37.118.2. Unless this security issue is addressed, syn-
chrophasors can never be trusted to support emerging
real-time control techniques.
B. PAPER CONTRIBUTIONS
A low cost, easily deployable and integrable solution is
required to address challenges presented in Section I-A.
Recently, Firouzi et al. [7] identified interoperability issues
between legacy and state-of-the-art PMUs and proposed a
solution based on an IEEE C37.118.2 to IEC 61850-90-5
gateway. However, their published work has several lim-
itations including: (i) the gateway lacks GDOI security
mechanism to ensure communication security, (ii) the gate-
way supports one way conversion from IEEE C37.118.2 to
IEC 61850-90-5 but not vice versa which is also essential
to properly address interoperability issues (e.g., an IEEE
C37.118.2 compliant WAMPAC application), (iii) the gate-
way functionalities were demonstrated for a PMU but lacks
support for multiple phasor devices (especially PDCs under
different configurations), (iv) detailed experimental evalua-
tion is missing to validate the suitability of gateway for PMUs
and PDCs in different synchrophasor applications with strict
latency and data rate requirements.
To properly address the key challenges (presented in
Section I-A) and overcome the limitations of the best previous
work [7], this paper describes the implementation of a flexible
security gateway that is compliant with both, IEEEC37.118.2
and IEC 61850-90-5 communication frameworks. The secu-
rity gateway is capable to receive synchrophasor data from
PMUs/PDCs in IEEE C37.118.2 or insecure IEC 61850-90-5
format, convert it into secure IEC 61850-90-5 using GDOI
security mechanism and transfer over wide-area network
to the control center. Further, a security gateway in con-
trol center converts back secure IEC 61850-90-5 packets
into the original insecure IEEE C37.118.2 or insecure
IEC 61850-90-5 packets. The conversion feature from
insecure IEC 61850-90-5 into secure IEC 61850-90-5 and
vice versa is essential as many IEC 61850-90-5 compliant
commercial phasor devices, applications and even tools (e.g.,
PMU Connection Tester) do not support security features.
The security policies and keying material used by the security
gateway are not fixed and replaced periodically. This pro-
vides strong protection against cryptanalysis as any cracked
security credentials will longer remain valid. In short, key
contributions of this paper include:
1) Design and implementation of GDOI security
mechanism. This paper provides clear functional
specification towards practically implementing GDOI
security mechanism as IEC 61850-90-5 [3] and
RFC 6407 [2] lacks sufficient technical implementation
guidelines.
2) Due to no open-source availability of communica-
tion frameworks (particularly IEC 61850-90-5), IEEE
C37.118.2 libraries and IEC 61850-90-5 libraries were
implemented and validated for the correctness of func-
tionalities with the PMU Connection Tester.
3) Implementation of the security gateway using
implemented IEEE C37.118.2 libraries and
IEC 61850-90-5 libraries and the integration of GDOI
security mechanism.
4) Functional analysis of the security gateway. Note that
Wireshark lacks support for IEC 691850-90-5 com-
munication framework. Thus, a Wireshark dissector
was also implemented and utilized in the functional
analysis.
5) Detailed performance evaluation of GDOI secu-
rity mechanism and the security gateway has been
performed in real networking environment. It is demon-
strated that an effective low cost and compact imple-
mentation of the security gateway is feasible using an
ARM processor.
6) Experimental evaluation of the security gateway with
real PMU, emulated PMU (ePMU) and different types
of emulated PDCs (ePDCs) under different configu-
rations. It is experimentally validated that the secu-
rity gateway is suitable for different types of PMUs
and PDCs in different categories of synchrophasor
applications which have strict latency and data rate
requirements.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents back-
ground and related work from literature. Section III presents
the design of the security gateway including GDOI secu-
rity mechanism. Section IV addresses implementation of the
security gateway. Section V practically evaluates the security
gateway in real networking environment and presents perfor-
mance metrics. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
Synchrophasor technology has great potential to play a vital
role in WAMPAC applications [8]. It can enable operators
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or control algorithms to take prompt actions through
real-time tracking of power system dynamics/disturbances.
It consists of two important components: PMUs and PDCs.
PMUs measure electrical quantities and transmit them to the
control center. PDCs aggregate data from multiple PMUs
(and/or other PDCs) based on GPS timestamp and send as
single output stream. The number of PMUs aggregated by
a PDC depends on the type and location (e.g., substation
PDC: 20-40 PMUs, regional center PDC: 50-500 PMUs,
super PDC: 500+ PMUs) [9].
FIGURE 1. IEEE C37.118.2 communication scenario.
Most legacy phasor devices support IEEE C37.118.2
communication framework which consists of four types
of messages: data (sent by PMU and contains actual
synchrophasor data), configuration (sent by PMU and con-
tains PMU configurations), command (received by PMU and
contains instructions/orders) and header (sent by PMU and
contains descriptive information in human readable format).
A basic communication scenario based on IEEE C37.118.2
is depicted in Fig. 1. IEEE C37.118.2 has no restriction
on communication mode and transport protocol but lacks
security mechanism [10]. IEC 61850-90-5 originally evolved
from IEC 61850 by modifying the two Ethernet protocols:
(i) Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) and
(ii) Sampled Value (SV)). As depicted in Fig. 2, the new
GOOSE and SV protocols are routable and operate over
transport layer and network layer protocols. The modified
protocols are also known as Routable-GOOSE (R-GOOSE)
and Routable-SV (R-SV). R-SV being a stream based pro-
tocol is the most suitable choice for synchrophasor commu-
nication. As shown in Fig. 2, IEC 61850-90-5 also include
a GDOI security mechanism for protecting R-GOOSE and
R-SV communication. It is notable that several recent
commercial PMUs support R-SV but lack GDOI security
mechanism. Authors in [11] explained challenges in com-
missioning of IEC 61850-90-5 and its comparison with IEEE
C37.118.2 is presented in [1]. An OpenPMU project is pre-
sented in [12] that is compliant with both IEEE C37.118.2
and IEC 61850-90-5.
IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 without GDOI
security mechanism are highly vulnerable to cyber
FIGURE 2. IEC 61850-90-5 protocol stack.
attacks. Several researchers have investigated vulnerabili-
ties especially in IEEE C37.118.2 [4]–[6], [10]. Authors
in [6] and [13] investigated different types of cyber attacks
on synchrophasor based systems. Authors in [14] per-
formed Denial of Service (DoS) attack and measured PMU
resilience when flooded with ARP requests and IPv4 packets.
They also measured resilience against malformed packets
through protocol mutation experiments. Authors in [15] sug-
gested firewall and Virtual Private Network (VPN) to protect
synchrophasor communication from cyber attacks. Authors
in [16] analyzed impact of packet drop attacks on synchropha-
sor based systems and proposed a mechanism for detecting
such attacks. Authors in [17] analyzed data integrity attacks
in synchrophasor-based WAMPAC applications. In short,
synchrophasor-based systems without a security mechanism
are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. Security challenges
for synchrophasors and smart grid in general have been
addressed in several survey articles [18], [19].
Firouzi et al. [7] proposed a low cost gateway that
converts IEEE C37.118.2 packets into IEC 61850-90-5.
However, their work lacks several features necessary for
properly addressing interoperability issues between legacy
and state-of-the-art phasor devices and WAMPAC applica-
tions (e.g., an IEEE C37.118.2 compliant WAMPAC appli-
cation). Further, their gateway lacks security features vital
for protection of synchrophasor-based systems from cyber
attacks. Thus, this paper presents a security gateway which
is very flexible and works under different configurations
of PMUs as well as PDCs. The security gateway not only
provides interoperability between legacy and state-of-the-
art phasor devices but also ensures protection against cyber
attacks by using the GDOI security mechanism.
III. DESIGN OF SECURITY GATEWAY
The security gateway acts as a secure proxy between two
otherwise inherently insecure end devices. The basic scenario
is depicted in Fig. 3. The security gateway can be a dedicated
device to each PMU/PDC or it can offer security services to
a group of PMUs and PDCs. In the substation, it receives
packets from PMU/PDC in insecure IEEE C37.118.2 or
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FIGURE 3. Security gateways in synchrophasor-based system.
insecure IEC 61850-90-5 format, encrypts them, applies
cryptographic signatures and transmits them to the security
gateway in control center as secure IEC 61850-90-5. The
security gateway in control center decrypts the packets, ver-
ifies signatures and provides the packets in insecure IEEE
C37.118.2 or insure IEC 61850-90-5 format to monitoring,
control or archiving application. Thus, the security gate-
way is flexible, configurable and equally suitable for any
legacy PMU/PDC or WAMPAC application which support
either IEEE C37.118.2 or IEC 61850-90-5 communication
framework.
The security gateway is intelligent enough that if a secure
IEC 61850-90-5 packet (i.e., has encryption or cryptographic
signature or both) is received from PMU/PDC in substation,
it simply forwards the packet to control center without apply-
ing encryption and cryptographic signature. This feature is
useful if a recent PMU/PDC is deployed in substation that
supports security features. Based on the security information
inside IEC 61850-90-5 packets, security gateway in control
center identifies such packets and forwards to WAMPAC
application without processing. The security gateway is also
intelligent enough to differentiate between received secure
and insecure packets. If the security gateway in the con-
trol center receives insecure packets (i.e., have no encryp-
tion and cryptographic signature) in IEEE C37.118.2 or
IEC 61850-90-5 format, it forwards them to control/moni-
toring application without processing. This feature is useful
if the security gateway is deployed for some legacy
PMUs/PDCs but not for all. In short, the security gateway
in the control center only processes a packet if it has both,
encryption as well as cryptographic signature applied by a
security gateway of a PMU/PDC. The security policies and
keying material used by the security gateways are not fixed
but instead replaced periodically based on the GDOI security
mechanism (i.e., a recommended security mechanism for
synchrophasor-based systems by IEC [3]).
This section provides an insight of the security gate-
way functionalities in order to highlight main architectural
components need to be implemented. In short, the design
of security gateway involves two challenges: (i) mapping
of IEEE C37.118.2 packets into IEC 61850-90-5 and vice
versa (addressed in Section III-A), and (ii) authentication and
periodic update of security polices and keying material based
on GDOI security mechanism (addressed in Section III-B).
A. MAPPING BETWEEN IEEE C37.118.2
AND IEC 61850-90-5
The security gateway can work in four possible scenarios:
(i) PMU/PDC is IEEE C37.118.2 compliant, (ii) PMU/PDC
is IEC 61850-90-5 compliant, (iii) WAMPAC application is
IEEE C37.118.2 compliant and (iv) WAMPAC application is
IEC 61850-90-5 compliant.
1) IEEE C37.118.2 COMPLIANT PMU/PDC
In this case, the security gateway receives packets from
a PMU/PDC in IEEE C37.118.2 format, maps them into
secure IEC 61850-90-5 format and transmits them to the
control center. To enable the security gateway to successfully
map IEEE C37.118.2 data messages into IEC 61850-90-5
R-SV messages, certain packets are exchanged between a
PMU/PDC and a security gateway. As depicted in Fig. 1, the
receiver needs configuration message type 2 (CFG-2) which
contains necessary information on how to decode upcoming
data messages. In short, the security gateway establishes
communication with a PMU/PDC as follows: Step-1: security
gateway sends command message to PMU/PDC and requests
CFG-2, Step-2: PMU/PDC provides CFG-2 to security gate-
way, Step-3: security gateway sends command message to
PMU/PDC and requests to start synchrophasor data trans-
mission, Step-4: PMU/PDC starts continuous streaming of
data messages (which contain actual synchrophasor data) to
security gateway, and Step-5: security gateway sends com-
mand message to PMU/PDC whenever necessary and
requests to stop synchrophasor data transmission. Note that
the security gateway converts only a continuous stream of
data messages into secure IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV format
using CFG-2 configurations.
FIGURE 4. Synchrophasor data mapping in IEEE C37.118.2 data message
and IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV message.
Fig. 4 illustrates mapping between IEEE C37.118.2 data
message and IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV message. For sake of
simplicity, Fig. 4 does not depict IEEE C37.118.2 CFG-2
configuration message, IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV session
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header/information and underlying layers (i.e., transport,
network, link layers). FREQ, DFREQ and size, format and
number of PHASORS, ANALOG AND DIGITAL values
in PMU data template in IEEE C37.118.2 data message (in
Fig. 4) are determined by the security gateway using CFG-2
configurations. For PDC, IEEE C37.118.2 data message con-
tains multiple PMU data templates (one for each PMU inside
a PDC). The same settings can be reflected in IEC 61850-90-5
as a R-SV session payload (in Fig. 4) can support multiple
Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs) and Application
Service Data Units (ASDUs) inside same packet. PHASORS,
ANALOG AND DIGITAL values in IEEE C37.118.2 data
message can be mapped into IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV dataset
objects using appropriate data types [3]. Before mapping, it is
necessary to apply correct conversion factors (i.e., PHUNIT,
ANUNIT, DIGUNIT) specified in CFG-2. Note that FREQ in
IEEEC37.118.2 data message represents frequency deviation
from nominal in mHz. To calculate actual frequency, nominal
line frequency (i.e., FNOM) information should be taken
into account from CFG-2. To determine the timestamp from
IEEE C37.118.2 data message, fractional time and SOC (i.e.,
second of century) should be added. Fractional time is
calculated by dividing first 24 bits of FRACSEC by the
TIME_BASE (specified in CFG-2). Note that R-SV APDU
template in Fig. 4 is ASN.1 encoded i.e., every field has Tag-
Length-Value (TLV) format. ASN.1 encoding helps uniquely
identify each field and its size. Detailed description of
PMU/PDC modeling into IEC 61850-90-5 logical devices
and nodes is out of scope for this paper and has been provided
in [3], [7], and [20]. The security gateway encrypts the IEC
61850-90-5 session payload and applies cryptographic signa-
ture on entire session layer data (excluding signature itself)
before transmitting the R-SV packet to the control center.
The session header also contains security information such
as IDs of encryption and signature algorithms, key ID, key
validity etc. The security features are based on GDOI security
mechanism and are addressed in Section III-B.
2) IEC 61850-90-5 COMPLIANT PMU/PDC
In this case, the security gateway may receive secure or
insecure IEC 61850-90-5 packets (depending on whether
a PMU/PDC supports a security mechanism). The security
gateway forwards packets to the control center and applies
encryption and cryptographic signature to only insecure
IEC 61850-90-5 packets. This scenario is computationally
less complex for the security gateway compared to IEEE
C37.118.2 compliant PMU/PDC as received packets are not
fully decoded. The security gateway decodes session header
and reads KeyID, TimeofCurrentKey, TimetoNextKey and
SecurityAlgorithms (i.e., IDs of encryption and signature
algorithms). If SecurityAlgorithms indicates that no encryp-
tion and no signature is used, the security gateway encrypts
the session payload and calculates/adds signature to the
packet. It also specifies KeyID, TimeofCurrentKey, Time-
toNextKey and SecurityAlgorithms in session header based
on the security credentials applied to that packet.
3) IEEE C37.118.2 COMPLIANT WAMPAC APPLICATION
In this case, the security gateway in the control center
receives secure IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV packets from the
security gateway of the substation (as depicted in Fig. 3),
verifies the signature, decrypts the packets, converts them
into IEEE C37.118.2 data messages and transmits them to
the control/monitoring/archiving application. The start of
communication between security gateway and control center
WAMPAC application follows same IEEE C37.118.2 seman-
tics as depicted in Fig. 1. In current implementations, the
security gateway can be configured to provide CFG-2 con-
figurations and data messages to the WAMPAC application
without being requested through IEEE C37.118.2 command
messages.
The mapping of IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV packets into IEEE
C37.118.2 data messages is illustrated in Fig. 4 and follows
the reverse process of that described in Section III-A.1. Note
that CFG-2 configurations are now created by the security
gateway and provided to the control center WAMPAC appli-
cation. As CFG-2 configurations contain information on how
to decode upcoming data messages, the security gateway
must generate and send newCFG-2message to theWAMPAC
application each time it changes scaling/conversion factors or
structure of the IEEE C37.118.2 data messages.
4) IEC 61850-90-5 COMPLIANT WAMPAC APPLICATION
In this case, the security gateway in the control center
receives secure IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV packets from the
security gateway of the substation (as depicted in Fig. 3),
verifies the signature, decrypts the packets and transmits
insecure IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV packets to the control/moni-
toring/archiving application. In this case, the security gateway
does not need to decode entire session payload/APDUs to
reduce computational complexity. To verify the signature
and decrypt a packet, the security gateway utilizes security
information specified in the same packet session header.
It is necessary that the security gateway resets security infor-
mation (i.e., KeyID, TimeofCurrentKey, TimetoNextKey and
SecurityAlgorithms) in newly generated insecure
IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV packets before transmitting them to
the control center WAMPAC application.
If security information inside a received secure IEC
61850-90-5 R-SV packet does not match the valid security
credentials provided by GDOI security mechanism, secu-
rity gateway simply forwards same packet to WAMPAC
application without any changes/processing. This indicates
that the PMU applied security features on this packet but
not the security gateway of the substation. However, such
scenario is rare in practice as most commercial PMUs
deployed in power systems lack security features as well as
IEC 61850-90-5 communication framework.
B. GDOI BASED SECURITY MECHANISM
GDOI is a group security framework and published by Cisco
Systems and MIT in RFC 6407 [2]. It is recommended
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security mechanism for synchrophasor-based systems by
IEC [3] due to its three key features: (i) authentication,
(ii) freshness and (iii) secrecy. Authentication ensures that
only allowed group member devices are able to acquire
security credentials and securely communicate among each
other. Freshness provides protection against cryptanalysis
attacks by periodically replacing/updating security creden-
tials. It also ensures that allowed devices could not be tricked
into accepting old/expired security credentials. GDOI ensures
two types of freshness: recency freshness (i.e., an authenti-
cated device should accept only the most recent security cre-
dentials which are valid for certain duration) and sequential
freshness (i.e., an authenticated device should never accept
security credentials it already has or used in the past). GDOI
ensures perfect forward secrecy i.e., if a security key is com-
promised, the adversary can only acquire new security keys
distributed under the protection of compromised key. How-
ever, past communication still remains protected and cannot
be decrypted by an adversary. The GDOI security mechanism
also provides forward and backward access control. Thus, a
device has no access to valid/current security credentials after
leaving the group (i.e., forward access control) and before
joining the group (i.e., backward access control). Every time a
device leaves the group, GDOI security mechanism generates
new security credentials and distributes to the remaining
group members.
The GDOI security mechanism consists of two phases:
phase-1: authentication and phase-2: periodic security cre-
dentials update. RFC 6407 [2] addresses only phase-2
but lacks details about phase-1 which is based on Inter-
net Security Association and Key Management Protocol
(ISAKMP). Further, IEC in [3] has briefly addressed minor
changes in GDOI phase-2 but lacks clear functional specifi-
cation towards practically implementing it. Thus, this section
provides clear functional understanding of GDOI security
mechanism for implementing it in the security gateway.
1) FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW OF SECURITY MECHANISM
FIGURE 5. Functional overview of GDOI security mechanism. Note that
the security gateway works as a group member of GCKS.
Fig. 5 depicts a functional overview of the GDOI secu-
rity mechanism. It consists of two types of devices: Group
Controller/Key Server (GCKS) and Group Member (GM).
As GDOI is a group security mechanism, GCKS manages
security policies and keying material for a certain number
of GMs. Based on the proposed system in Fig. 3, each security
gateway acts as a GM of GCKS. After acquiring security
credentials from GCKS, GMs can securely communication
among each other. To ensure communication among GMs
remains highly secure, GCKS periodically updates group
security policies and keying material. It is possible in GDOI
that a single GCKS manages multiple groups (each group
with different security policies and keying material) or a
single group is managed by multiple GCKSs. This feature is
useful if a security gateway is used in more than one syn-
chrophasor application. In current implementations, GCKS
canmanage only one group and assumes that each GMdevice
is part of only one group.
After GDOI phase-1 (i.e., authentication between a
GM and GCKS), GDOI phase-2 consists of two types
of exchanges: (i) GroupKey-Pull and (ii) GroupKey-Push.
During GroupKey-Pull, a GM requests group security poli-
cies and keying material from GCKS.Whereas in GroupKey-
Push, GCKS distributes updates of group security policies
and keying material to all authorized GMs. In short, the
functionalities of GCKS include: (i) generate and manage
group security policies and keying material, (ii) process
authentication requests from GMs, (iii) perform GroupKey-
Pull exchange with GMs, (iv) admit a GM or expel it from the
group, and (v) declare new security credentials as current and
cause old security credentials to expire (even before its valid-
ity if necessary). The actions of a GM are limited and include:
(i) initiate authentication with GCKS, (ii) initiate GroupKey-
Pull exchangewith GCKS, and (iii) accept updates of security
credentials through GroupKey-Push.
2) TYPES OF SECURITY POLICIES AND KEYING MATERIAL
As depicted in Fig. 5, GDOI security mechanism consists
of three types of security policies and keying material:
(i) Pairwise key, (ii) Key Encryption Key (KEK) and
(iii) Traffic Encryption Key (TEK). Pairwise security cre-
dentials are specific to each GM and are used during its
authenticationwith GCKS to join a specific group (i.e., GDOI
phase-1). Pairwise key also protects GroupKey-Pull exchange
used to acquire KEK and TEK from GCKS. KEK and TEK
security policies and keying material are generated by GCKS
and are specific to GDOI phase-2. KEK protects GroupKey-
Push exchange in which GCKS provides updates of security
policies and keying material (i.e., new KEK and new TEK).
Whereas, TEK security credentials are used to protect com-
munication among GMs.
3) AUTHENTICATION AND PAIRWISE
SECURITY CREDENTIALS
RFC 6407 [2] does not specify mutual authentication and
authorization between GM and GCKS. The choice of authen-
tication technique, pairwise security policies and keying
material depends on the developers. The authentication pro-
cess can be based on certificates, pre-shared keys or any other
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FIGURE 6. Diffie Hellman mechanism for pairwise key establishment
between GCKS and a group member.
public key cryptography technique. This paper addresses
GDOI phase-1 authentication based on authorization list
(i.e., verifying GM’s identity) and Diffie Hellman public key
cryptography technique. Thus, the authentication phase is
very light-weight, flexible, scalable and specially suitable for
constrained devices.
Fig. 6 illustrates the establishment of pairwise key between
a GM and GCKS using Diffie-Hellman public key cryptog-
raphy technique. It can be observed that both devices have no
prior knowledge about the secret key and establish it jointly.
It can be observed in Fig. 6 that GM and GCKS first agree
on a prime, p and generator, g. They generate a private key
and calculate public key from it using prime and generator
in a specific mathematical model. The public keys can take
any value between 1 to p-1. Both devices exchange their
public key with one another and derive a common shared
secret key from it using a specific mathematical model. This
key is used as pairwise key to protect GDOI phase-2 in
current implementations. The shared key has two features:
(i) it cannot be generated by a device alone but can only
be generated jointly by interacting with other device, and
(ii) no third party (that is not involved in the communication)
can deduce the shared secret key. It is worth to mention
that messages exchanged in Diffie-Hellman are unencrypted.
However, any eavesdropping on the communication cannot
enable adversaries to deduce the secret key. The larger the val-
ues of private keys and prime, the more secure will be Diffie-
Hellman exchange. Different Oakley groups are defined for
Diffie-Hellman exchange which are mainly different in how
the prime is generated [21]. Current implementations are
based on default Oakley group with 768 bits prime number.
Three different types of ISAKMP authentication tech-
niques are available for exchange of public keys (i.e., step 4
in Fig. 6): (i) Base Exchange (BE), (ii) Identity Protection
Exchange (IPE) and (iii) Aggressive Exchange (AE). They
aremainly different in terms of number of packets exchanged,
their structure and encryption as depicted in Fig. 7. The
format/structure of each payload type in Fig. 7 is defined
in [21]–[23] and is out of scope of this paper. AE is the fastest
authentication technique due to exchange of very few packets.
The key limitation of BE and AE is the lack of identity
protection of communicating devices from eavesdroppers.
Thus, the implementations in this paper targeted IPE even
though it is comparatively a bit slower authentication
technique. The IPE (as depicted in Fig. 7(b)) consists of
six steps: step-1: GM offers security proposal or multiple
proposals (e.g., encryption algorithm, authentication algo-
rithm, key type, key validity etc) to GCKS, step-2: GCKS
chooses appropriate proposal and responds to the GM with
accept/reject decision, step-3: GM sends its Diffie Hellman
public key and related data to GCKS, step-4:GCKS provides
its own Diffie Hellman public key to GM, step-5: GM cal-
culates shared secret key (i.e., step 5 in Fig. 6), uses it to
encrypt its identification information and sends to GCKS, and
step-6: GCKS also calculates shared secret key, uses it to
verify GM’s identity and provides its own identification infor-
mation to GM.
4) GroupKey-PULL EXCHANGES
GroupKey-Pull is initiated by GMs to acquire security poli-
cies and keying material (i.e., KEK and TEK) from GCKS
under the protection of GDOI phase-1 pairwise security cre-
dentials. The goal of GroupKey-Pull is to establish rekeying
with GCKS and acquire security credentials for secure com-
munication among group members (i.e., security gateways).
GroupKey-Pull uses nonces to guarantee liveness and achieve
protection against replay attacks. GDOI GroupKey-Pull con-
sists of total four steps/messages as depicted in Fig. 8: step-1:
a GM requests KEK and TEK security policies from GCKS,
step-2: GCKS responds to GM with the supported security
policies, step-3: GM sends key download request to GCKS,
and step-4: GCKS responds to GM with KEK and TEK and
their security policies. The format/structure of each payload
type in Fig. 8 is defined in [2]. It is worth to mention that
some payload types have different structure than ISAKMP
payloads in Fig. 7. Further, the structure of KD payload
(which contains actual KEK and TEK security policies and
keying material) is slightly different from [2] and presented
by IEC in [3].
It can be observed in Fig. 8 that each message has a unique
HASH calculation method according to RFC 2409 [21]. Each
HASH is calculated using pseudo-random function (prf) over
certain data as follows:
HASH(1) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | Ni | ID)
HASH(2) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | Ni_b | Nr | SA)
HASH(3) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | Ni_b | Nr_b | GAP)
HASH(4) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | Ni_b | Nr_b | SEQ | KD)
where SKEYID_a is GDOI phase-1 secret and M-ID is
message ID. Ni and Nr are initiator (i.e., GM) and responder
(i.e., GCKS) nonce payloads, respectively. Ni_b and Nr_b are
nonce values passed inside Ni and Nr, respectively. The SEQ
ensures anti-replay state and protects GM from accepting
GroupKey-Push message sent prior to joining the group.
5) GroupKey-PUSH EXCHANGE
GCKS provides security policies and keying material updates
to GMs in GroupKey-Push exchange. GroupKey-Push
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FIGURE 7. GDOI phase-1 authentication based on ISAKMP exchanges. The * indicates that the data is encryption from this point till the end of packet.
(a) Base Exchange. (b) Identity Protection Exchange. (c) Aggressive Exchange.
FIGURE 8. GDOI GroupKey-Pull exchange under the protection of phase-1
security credentials. The * indicates that the data is encryption from this
point till the end of packet.
FIGURE 9. GDOI GroupKey-Push exchange under the protection of
current KEK security credentials. The * indicates that the data is
encryption from this point till the end of packet.
exchange consists of a single message sent by GCKS to
GMs as depicted in Fig. 9. It provides updates of KEK,
TEK or both. It can be a multicast message to all group
members or unicast message to a single group member.
Current implementations are using unicast message to all
group members upon expiry of previous security credentials.
KD payload in Fig. 9 should follow the structure specified
in [3] instead of [2]. The signature value in SIG payload is
calculated over the entire GroupKey-Push message (except
SIG payload content). GroupKey-Pushmessage also contains
SEQ payload to achieve protection against replayed packets.
It is worth to mention that sequence number in SEQ payload
is incremented only when a new GroupKey-Push message is
sent (GroupKey-Pull uses current value of sequence number
without incrementing).
IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS
The GDOI security mechanism is implemented as a stan-
dalone software package and integrated into the security
gateway. Thus, this section addresses implementation of a
GDOI security package (in Section IV-A), implementation
of the security gateway software i.e., without GDOI security
(in Section IV-B) and integration of GDOI security package
in the security gateway software (in Section IV-C).
FIGURE 10. Building blocks of GDOI security package.
A. GDOI SECURITY PACKAGE
The GDOI security package is implemented in Linux OS
using Python programming language and PyCrypto libraries.
The basic reference architecture of the GDOI security pack-
age is depicted in Fig. 10. It consists of several important
modules/components. The User Interface enables the GDOI
application to receive instructions or commands from the
user. This module is flexible enough to support multiple user
interfaces to allow access to GDOI application both locally
(i.e., through command terminal) and over the network (e.g.,
using TCP or UDP protocols). The Application Manager is
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TABLE 1. The configuration database in developed GDOI security package.
responsible for managing and controlling different GDOI
functionalities. It performs coordination activities between
different modules in the core of the GDOI application and
also enables the user to control the application in real-time.
Further, it also updates the user about the current state of the
application and any problem that arises during the application
run-time.
The Configuration Database stores all the user specified
configurations which are loaded at run time. The configura-
tions belong to different modules and control their functional-
ities. Table 1 lists all configurable options in GDOI security
package which are divided into four categories: (i) general
configurations, (ii) authentication configurations, (iii) KEK
configurations and (iv) TEK configurations. Note that GCKS
and GM are implemented as a single software package and
DEVICE_TYPE in general configurations decides the role of
the application. The INTEGRATION_ADDRESS indicates
the socket address on which GDOI GM provides TEK secu-
rity credentials acquired from GCKS. It is used to integrate
GDOI security package into the security gateway software.
The authentication configurations are relevant to GDOI GMs
(i.e., when DEVICE_TYPE is Member) used during authen-
tication and pairwise key establishment (i.e., GDOI phase-1).
Whereas, KEK and TEK configurations are used by GCKS
(i.e., when DEVICE_TYPE is GCKS) during GroupKey-Pull
and GroupKey-Push exchanges (i.e., GDOI phase-2).
As depicted in Fig. 10, the core of GDOI application
consists of seven modules. Encryption Algorithms module
contains encryption and decryption methods for different
algorithms. At present, the implementations support three
encryption algorithms: AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM
and AES-256-CBC. The choice of encryption algorithm
for different GDOI security associations should be speci-
fied in configuration database. The Signature Algorithms
module contains cryptographic signature calculation and
verification methods for different algorithms. At present,
the implementations support seven signature algorithms:
HMAC-SHA256-80,HMAC-SHA256-128,HMAC-SHA256,
HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512, AES-GMAC64 and
AES-GMAC128. The choice of signature algorithm for
different GDOI security associations should also be speci-
fied in configuration database. The Authentication Manager
module implements authentication and pairwise key estab-
lishment techniques. At present, Diffie-Hellman is the only
supported technique. Task Scheduler module is responsible
for executing a task at a given time instant such as keys
validity check, or other periodic events. The basic architecture
of the Task Scheduler is shown in Fig. 11. Internally, it
consists of a queue of pending tasks. Each task has a due
time to execute. If the task is a periodic task (e.g., periodic
keys replacement), it is placed back into the queue with its
new due time. The waiting queue of tasks always remains
sorted w.r.t due time. Pairwise Credentials module in Fig. 10
is responsible for managing records of pairwise security poli-
cies and keying material between GCKS and each GM. KEK
Credentials and TEK Credentials modules are responsible
for managing KEK and TEK security policies and keying
material, respectively. Since, both KEK and TEK have certain
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TABLE 2. The configuration database of the security gateway software.
FIGURE 11. The task scheduler module.
FIGURE 12. The building blocks of the security gateway software.
validity, these modules are also responsible for periodically
generating new security credentials and distributing to all
authenticated GMs.
B. SECURITY GATEWAY SOFTWARE
Security gateway software is also implemented in Linux OS
using Python programming language. Its main building
blocks are depicted in Fig. 12. Like the GDOI security
package in Fig. 10, the security gateway software also con-
tains User Interface and Configuration Database blocks (not
depicted in Fig. 12 for sake of simplicity). The user interface
module is flexible and can support multiple local or network
based interfaces. Table 2 lists configurable options for the
security gateway software which are loaded at run time.
The configurations are divided into three different categories:
(i) general configurations, (ii) IEEE C37.118.2 configura-
tions and (iii) IEC 61850-90-5 configurations. It can be
observed in Fig. 3 that the role of the security gateway
software is different depending on its location (e.g., sub-
station or control center). Thus, the general configurations
contain an option GATEWAY_TYPEwhich indicates the role
of the security gateway. If the security gateway is used for
PMU/PDC (i.e., in substation), GATEWAY_TYPE should be
encrypter. In control center, GATEWAY_TYPE for the secu-
rity gateway should be decrypter. The general configurations
also contain an option that indicates the output format of the
security gateway (i.e., IEEE C37.118.2 or IEC 61850-90-5).
Depending on the GATEWAY_TYPE, the output of security
gatewaywill be secure (i.e., encryption and signature applied)
or insecure (i.e., no encryption and no signature applied). The
IEEE C37.118.2 configurations provide flexibility to choose
different transport protocols for different types of messages.
The IEC 61850-90-5 configurations allow the security gate-
way to work in unicast or multicast fashion. Further, it
also allows to choose a protocol for sending synchrophasor
packets.
The functionalities of Application Manager, Task Sched-
uler, Encryption Algorithms and Signature Algorithms
modules in Fig. 12 are similar as in GDOI security package
addressed in Section IV-A. The IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC
61850-90-5 modules provide complete implementations of
IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 communication frame-
works, respectively. Both modules provide encoding and
decoding methods of relevant protocols. Due to lack of open
source availability of IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5
libraries, both IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 libraries
were first implemented in Python and then integrated into the
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FIGURE 13. The integration of GDOI security package in synchrophasor
security gateway. The security gateway can send and receive packets in
IEEE C37.118.2 or IEC 61850-90-5 format. The communication between
security gateways is based on IEC 61850-90-5 communication framework.
security gateway software. Security gateway also contains
GDOI client. It receives TEK security policies and keying
material from GDOI GM over loopback network interface.
To decrypt received packets or encrypt transmitting
packets, Application Manager acquires security credentials
from GDOI client.
C. INTEGRATION OF GDOI SECURITY PACKAGE IN
SECURITY GATEWAY
Fig. 13 depicts the integration of two separately implemented
software packages i.e., GDOI security package and secu-
rity gateway. To this aim, a network interface is created on
which GDOI GM provides TEK and its associated security
policies to the security gateway software. Loopback network
interface can be the ideal choice as GDOI GM and security
gateway software are expected to run on the same device.
However, integration interface is configurable in the configu-
ration database of both software. After acquiring TEK secu-
rity credentials, security gateway software can successfully
encrypt and decrypt packets.
Since security credentials have certain validity and
replaced periodically, the security gateway in the receiver
network needs to know what security policies and key were
used on any received packet. Note: GCKS also replaces
security credentials when a GM leaves the group. To this
aim, security information is included inside IEC 61850-90-5
session header as depicted in Fig. 14. This includes key ID,
IDs of encryption and signature algorithms, TimeofCurren-
tKey (i.e., time when the key was first assigned by GCKS)
and TimetoNextKey (i.e., timewhen the keywill expire). This
information helps the security gateway in the receiver net-
work to know if it has the right security credentials available
to process the packet. If security information mismatches, it
forwards the original packet toWAMPAC applicationwithout
processing (i.e., a possible scenario if PMU itself has applied
its own security credentials on packet).
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The testbed used for experimental evaluation is simi-
lar to Fig. 13. It consists of five devices with different
FIGURE 14. Session information inside IEC 61850-90-5 packets.
functionalities: (i) PMU/PDC, (ii) Encrypter Gateway
(i.e., security gateway plus GDOI GM in sender network),
(iii) Decrypter Gateway (i.e., security gateway plus GDOI
GM in receiver network), (iv) WAMPAC application and
(v) GDOI GCKS. To reduce the complexity and cost of
synchrophasor-based systems, encrypter gateway, decrypter
gateway and GDOI GCKS were executed on compact and
inexpensive ARM based device i.e., Raspberry Pi v2 (ARM
Cortex-A7 CPU 900 MHz, RAM 1 GB). The PMU was
a commercial PMU from ABB that supports only IEEE
C37.118.2 communication framework and was configured to
provide three phase measurements. However, to evaluate the
security gateway for PDC and PMU with IEC 61850-90-5
support, ePMU and ePDC were implemented using devel-
oped IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 libraries. The
ePMU and ePDC were executed on a standard PC and were
very flexible and configurable. The WAMPAC application
was executed on a standard PC and supports both, IEEE
C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 communication frameworks.
For sake of experiments, it was designed to provide only
monitoring functionalities by properly decoding and visual-
izing received synchrophasor data.
The first step in experimental evaluation is to verify the cor-
rect functioning of all developed software entities including
IEEE C37.118.2 libraries, IEC 61850-90-5 libraries, ePMU,
ePDC, security gateway, GDOI security package and its inte-
gration in the security gateway. The functional verification
of IEEE C37.118.2 libraries and IEC 61850-90-5 libraries
was performed using the PMU Connection Tester tool. The
PMU Connection Tester successfully decoded and visualized
synchrophasor data indicating the correctness of implemen-
tations. The functional evaluation of ePMU and ePDC was
performed by analyzing their output with Wireshark packet
capturing tool. It is notable that Wireshark lacks support for
IEC 61850-90-5 communication framework at present. Thus,
a dissector, compliant with the specifications described in
IEC 61850-90-5 technical document [3], was implemented
and integrated in Wireshark (as shown in Fig. 15). Under
different configurations of ePMU and ePDC (e.g., output in
IEEE C37.118.2 or IEC 61850-90-5 format, PDC with spec-
ified number of PMUs data, etc), their communication with
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FIGURE 15. Functional analysis of R-SV traffic using the implemented IEC
61850-90-5 compliant Wireshark dissector. (a) IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV
without GDOI. (b) IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV with GDOI.
the security gateway was analyzed in Wireshark. Analyzing
configuration and data messages of IEEE C37.118.2 and
R-SVmessages of IEC 61850-90-5 inWireshark verified cor-
rect functioning of ePMU and ePDC emulators. Functional
verification of GDOI security package was also performed
and GM was able to successfully authenticate with GCKS
and received updated security policies and keying material.
GM provided security credentials to the security gateway on
loopback network interface which were then used for encryp-
tion/decryption and cryptographic signature calculation/
verification in synchrophasor packets. Analyzing network
traffic between encrypter gateway and decrypter gateway
in Wireshark verified that security credentials were suc-
cessfully updated on periodic basis (depending on GCKS
configurations). The encrypter gateway was able to parse
and convert received IEEE C37.118.2 or insecure IEC
61850-90-5 packets into secure IEC 61850-90-5 packets.
Analyzing the output of the decrypter gateway in Wireshark
verified that secure IEC 61850-90-5 packets were success-
fully converted back into original IEEEC37.118.2 or insecure
IEC 61850-90-5 packets depending on the configurations of
decrypter gateway.
After functional verification of all developed software
entities in experimental testbeds, the next step is to measure
performance critical factors (e.g., communication overhead,
latencies, resource requirements, etc) under extreme/worse
conditions which may impact the effectiveness or real-time
performance of security gateway. The main objective of mea-
suring performance metrics is to investigate if the compact
low-cost ARM-based Raspberry Pi is suitable to function as
security gateway when deployed in legacy synchrophasor-
based networks. Also performance metrics help to analyze
potential impact of security gateway and especially the GDOI
security mechanism on different types of synchrophasor
applications with very strict data rate and latency require-
ments. Depending on the configurations, the computational
complexity and resource requirements for GDOI security
mechanism might be relatively low. However, the security
gateway faces challenges to meet the requirements of laten-
cies and data transmission rates. Thus, the quantitative and
qualitative evaluation is divided into two parts: (i) perfor-
mance evaluation of GDOI security package (presented in
Section V-A) and (ii) performance evaluation of security
gateway (presented in Section V-B).
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF GDOI
SECURITY PACKAGE
This section evaluates GDOI security package and presents
results related to GCKS and GM as shown in the testbed
in Fig. 13. It mainly analyzes network traffic overhead in
GDOI security mechanism, required network resources and
computational cost for GCKS.
1) NETWORK TRAFFIC OVERHEAD
Network traffic overhead is considered a significant per-
formance metric for any security mechanism. It affects the
maximum size of real-information/data that can be carried
inside a single packet. However, for security mechanism
based on Key Distribution Center (KDC), network traffic
overhead information is useful to determine the required com-
munication channel capacity enough for transmitting certain
number of messages. The KDC/GCKS might be authenti-
cating and providing security policies and keying material
to potentially hundreds or thousands of client devices. Thus,
the communication channel should have enough capacity to
allow smooth and reliable communication between GCKS
and its all GMs.
Fig. 16 analyzes network traffic overhead for GDOI secu-
rity mechanism. During the experiment, a GM authenticates
with GCKS using IPE exchange, performs GroupKey-Pull
and GroupKey-Push exchanges, intentionally sends an error
notification message and finally instructs GCKS to remove
it from the group and delete its already established secu-
rity association. Fig. 16(a) depicts total Bytes exchanged
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FIGURE 16. Analysis of network traffic overhead for GDOI security mechanism. (a) Percentage overhead and total Bytes exchanged during different
GDOI phases. (b) Average packet size and total number of packets exchanged during different GDOI phases.
during each individual GDOI phase. It also classifies packets
and presents the percentage of real-information (i.e., actuals
payloads), percentage of overhead Bytes due to ISAKMP/
GDOI header and percentage of overhead Bytes due to com-
munication (i.e., transport, network and Ethernet layers).
It can be observed that amount of real-information is quite
high compared to communication overhead during authen-
tication, GroupKey-Pull and GroupKey-Push. However,
packets during error notification and device de-registration
are small and contain high percentage of overhead Bytes.
For better understanding of the network traffic overhead,
Fig. 16(b) depicts the average packet size and total number
of packets exchanged during each individual GDOI phase.
It can be observed in Fig. 16 that certain packets are quite
big and contain significant overhead Bytes as well. However,
all the packets are exchanged only once for each GM except
the GroupKey-Push (i.e., depends on GCKS configurations
and contains periodic updates for KEK and TEK) and error
notification (i.e., only sent in case of error in decoding a
received packet).
2) RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Based on the fact that GCKS is executed on the Raspberry Pi
with limited memory, it should be able to provide service to
hundreds or thousands of client devices (i.e., GMs). To assess
memory requirement, increasing number of emulated client
devices were registered with GCKS. It can be observed in
Fig. 17 that each additional client device requires approxi-
mately 3.51 KB of memory at GCKS. Due to very low mem-
ory requirement, the 1 GB available memory is more than
enough to easily offer security services to thousands of client
devices. Furthermore, we observed that CPU usage was quite
low during client device authentication and GroupKey-Pull.
During steady state (i.e., when no new device authentication
is performed), CPU usage was negligible as GCKS does not
perform any task/computations. Note that GroupKey-Push
messages are very infrequent.
FIGURE 17. Memory and bandwidth requirement with increasing number
of registered GCKS client devices. Note: bandwidth requirement considers
simultaneous registration from client devices (i.e., Bytes exchange during
GDOI phase-1 authentication and GroupKey-Pull).
To avoid traffic congestion and packet loss, minimum
required bandwidth/channel capacity should be available for
GCKS. Fig. 17 also depicts communication channel band-
width requirement when simultaneous authentication and
GroupKey-Pull requests are received from increasing number
of client devices. It can be observed that bandwidth require-
ment is less than 1.8Mbps even when 100 client devices (well
beyond to expect in realistic scenarios) simultaneously per-
form authentication with GCKS. This makes GCKS suitable
for most available access technologies today (e.g., ADSL lite,
ADSL2+, etc).
3) LATENCIES ANALYSIS
Another performance critical factor for real-time appli-
cations is processing latency. The GCKS processing
latencies indirectly represent how many client devices
authentication/GroupKey-Pull can be performed per second.
Comparatively, high latencies are consideredmore critical for
GroupKey-Push that provides security policies and keying
material updates to authenticated clients. Long delays in
receiving updated security credentials may leave client device
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TABLE 3. Processing latencies during different phases of GDOI.
with out-dated security credentials and unable to communi-
cate with other GMs. Table 3 presents latencies experienced
during authentication, GroupKey-Pull and GroupKey-Push
exchanges. The latencies are averaged over 100 trials and
include both, GCKS and GM processing latencies. It can be
observed in Table 3 that latencies are quite small. Exclud-
ing GM processing latencies, GCKS can easily perform
authentication and GroupKey-Pull with up to 5 client devices
per second. It is still a quite good number considering low
processing power of GCKS (i.e., Raspberry Pi). With the
configuration of GCKS to provide new security policies and
keying material to client devices 5 seconds before the expiry
of old security credentials, the 21.96 ms average GroupKey-
Push latency does not severely impact the GDOI operations.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SECURITY GATEWAY
This section evaluates the effectiveness of security gateway
in both sender (i.e., encrypter gateway) and receiver (i.e.,
decrypter gateway) networks as shown in the testbed in
Fig. 13. It mainly analyzes the impact of security gateway
on required network resources and evaluates its suitability for
different types of synchrophasor applications.
For experiments reported in this section, ePMU is config-
ured to include three phasor integer values in polar format,
two analog values in floating point format and one digital
word (i.e., representing 16 digital status points) in each IEEE
C37.118.2 data message. Note frequency and Rate Of Change
Of Frequency (ROCOF) are also in integer format. These
configurations are reported by ePMU to the security gateway
in IEEE C37.118.2 configuration message. Same settings are
used when ePMU uses IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV. In case of
ePDC, all the embedded PMUs have same configurations as
the ePMU.
1) NETWORK TRAFFIC OVERHEAD AND
BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENT
Network traffic overhead is a very critical factor for
synchrophasor-based real-time control and monitoring in
smart grid. High data transmission rates of bulky packets
containing significant overhead Bytes can increase the
requirement of channel capacity/bandwidth. On low band-
width channels, throughput is normally reduced and probabil-
ity of packet loss increases. Synchrophasor-based real-time
control and monitoring applications normally involve high
data transmission rates and require communication channels
with enough transmission capacity. Depending on the
FIGURE 18. Analysis of network traffic overhead and bandwidth
requirement for PDC aggregating data from increasing number of PMUs.
synchrophasor application, any packet loss could result in
devastating consequences.
To analyze the impact of the security gateway on network
traffic overhead, Fig. 18 depicts overhead for IEEEC37.118.2
data messages and IEC 61850-90-5 R-SVmessages for ePDC
aggregating data from increasing number of PMUs. Real-
information in Fig. 18 designates the actual synchrophasor
data inside packets while overhead represents the additional
Bytes added to packets (at link, network and transport layers).
With increase in the number of PMUs data inside PDC,
the percentage of real-information inside packets increases
and the overhead percentage decreases. Fig. 18 also depicts
bandwidth requirement when a single IEEE C37.118.2 or
IEC 61850-90-5 packet is transmitted per second. It can
be observed that IEEE C37.118.2 has comparatively much
higher overhead percentage but its bandwidth requirement
is much lower than IEC 61850-90-5. It is due to the fact
that IEEE C37.118.2 packets are much smaller in size than
IEC 61850-90-5 packets for carrying the same amount of
information.
The bandwidth requirement depends on: (i) PDC types
(i.e., how many PMUs data is aggregated?), (ii) commu-
nication framework (IEEE C37.118.2 or IEC 61850-90-5),
and (iii) data transmission rate. Fig. 18 depicts bandwidth
requirement when a single packet is transmitted per second.
Synchrophasor applications normally involve very high data
transmission rates. Authors in [24] classified synchrophasor
applications into 5 different categories depending on the
required message transmission rates: Very Low (1 packet/
second), Low (up to 30 packets/second), Medium (up to
60 packets/second), High (up to 120 packets/second), and
Ultra (up to 720 packet/second). In Table 4, the bandwidth
requirement has been analyzed for these five category of syn-
chrophasor applications. It can be observed in Table 4 that the
use of security gateway (whose output is in IEC 61850-90-5
format) will significantly increase the channel bandwidth
requirement as most commercial PMUs support IEEE
C37.118.2. The difference in the bandwidth requirement
VOLUME 5, 2017 11639
R. Khan et al.: Design and Implementation of Security Gateway
TABLE 4. Bandwidth requirement for IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 synchrophasor communication frameworks.
TABLE 5. Memory requirement for security gateway.
for IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC 61850-90-5 significantly
increases with increase in the data transmission rate and
PDC type. For very high data transmission rates and
PDC (i.e., aggregating data from 50 PMUs), many access
technologies such as ADSL lite(downstream 1.5 Mbps
and upstream 0.5 Mbps), ADSL1 (downstream 8 Mbps and
upstream 1.0 Mbps), ADSL2 (downstream 12 Mbps and
upstream 1.3 Mbps), ADSL2+ (downstream 24 Mbps
and upstream 1.4 Mbps), ADSL2+M (downstream 24 Mbps
and upstream 3.3 Mbps), etc could not provide enough
capacity. Optical fiber network (which supports over
100 Gbps) could be a suitable choice. However, not every
country has optical fiber network installed. It is worth to men-
tion that this is not the limitation of security gateway but the
IEC 61850-90-5 communication framework. If PMU/PDC
provides data to security gateway in IEC 61850-90-5 for-
mat, the security gateway will have negligible impact
on bandwidth requirement. Due to limitations of IEEE
C37.118.2 and unique/useful features of IEC 61850-90-5 [1],
IEC 61850-90-5 will sooner or later become part of the
synchrophasor systems.
2) MEMORY REQUIREMENT
Table 5 presents memory requirement for security gate-
way based on the experimental testbed depicted in Fig. 13.
Total memory requirement should take into account mem-
ory required by GCKS GM as well as memory required
for security gateway software. It is obvious in Table 5
that total memory requirement is very low and even tradi-
tional gateway devices (which are normally equipped with
32 or 64 MB memory) can meet the requirement for syn-
chrophasor’s security gateway.
3) COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Security gateway software is intended to be executed on
low power Raspberry Pi with limited processing capabil-
ities, the computational complexity could impact its suit-
ability for different types of synchrophasor applications.
Security gateway processing latency is a very critical factor
FIGURE 19. Security gateway processing latency and maximum supported
data rate when no encryption and no signature is used (i.e., security
gateway transmits insecure IEC 61850-90-5 packets).
that could limit the throughput or maximum supported
data rate. High latency means low supported data rate by
the security gateway. The computational complexity for
the encrypter gateway (i.e., security gateway in sender
network) could be different from the decrypter gateway (i.e.,
security gateway in receiver network) due to different func-
tionalities involved. The final supported data rate depends on
the security gateway (encrypter or decrypter) with maximum
latency value.
Security gateway processing latencies depend on two
factors: (i) conversion of packets from one communication
framework into the other, and (ii) complexity of security
algorithms (i.e., encryption and cryptographic signature).
To assess the computational complexity in securing incom-
ing packets, the security gateway processing latencies were
measured while it is receiving IEEEC37.118.2 data messages
and IEC 61850-90-5 R-SV messages from ePDC that aggre-
gates data from increasing number of PMUs. Fig. 19 depicts
processing latencies andmaximum supported data rates when
the security gateway does not apply any encryption and signa-
ture calculation/verification. In this case, processing latencies
solely depend on the computational complexity involved in
converting IEEE C37.118.2 packets into IEC 61850-90-5
packets and vice versa. It can be observed in Fig. 19 that
processing latencies are high when input of encrypter gate-
way and output of decrypter gateway are in IEEE C37.118.2
format. Further, processing latencies increase rapidly when a
PDC carries data from a large number of PMUs.
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FIGURE 20. Encrypter gateway processing latency and maximum supported data rate with increasing number of PMUs data inside packets. Dotted
lines represent latencies while smooth lines represent data rates. Results are averaged over 100 trials. (a) IEEE to IEC using AES-128-GCM. (b) IEEE
to IEC using AES-256-GCM. (c) IEC to IEC using AES-128-GCM. (d) IEC to IEC using AES-256-GCM.
TABLE 6. Analysis of the security gateway suitability for different types of synchrophasor applications.
To measure the impact of encryption and signature algo-
rithms on the supported data rates by the security gate-
way, Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 depict processing latencies of
encrypter and decrypter gateways, respectively. It can be
observed that the difference in computational complexity of
AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM encryption algorithms
VOLUME 5, 2017 11641
R. Khan et al.: Design and Implementation of Security Gateway
FIGURE 21. Decrypter gateway processing latency and maximum supported data rate with increasing number of PMUs data inside packets. Dotted
lines represent latencies while smooth lines represent data rates. Results are averaged over 100 trials. (a) IEC to IEEE using AES-128-GCM. (b) IEC to
IEEE using AES-256-GCM. (c) IEC to IEC using AES-128-GCM. (d) IEC to IEC using AES-256-GCM.
is negligible. However, AES-GMAC based signature algo-
rithms have significant higher processing latencies compared
to HMAC-SHA based algorithms especially for PDC that
aggregates data from large number of PMUs. It can be
observed in Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 that the maximum supported
data rates by the security gateway depend on what encryption
and signature algorithms used. Further, decrypter gateway
latencies are slighter higher than the encrypter gateway. Thus,
the decrypter gateway supports slightly lower data rates com-
pared to encrypter gateway. It can also be observed that the
security gateway supported data rate is low when input of
encrypter gateway and output of decrypter gateway are in
IEEE C37.118.2 format.
Table 6 analyzes the suitability of the security gateway
for different types of synchrophasor applications based on
its supported data rates. It considers five categories of appli-
cations defined in [24] with strict latency and data rate
requirements. The rate in Table 6 represents the number of
packets transmitted per second. It can be observed that for
PMU, security gateway meets the requirements of very low,
low, medium and highly critical synchrophasor applications.
For PDC, the security gateway meets the requirements for
synchrophasor applications with medium data transmission
rates. It is worth noting that security gateway receiving high
data rate packets than its supported capacity will result in
packet loss. However, results in Table 6 are presented for a
Raspberry Pi based security gateway that has very low pro-
cessing power. For ultra critical synchrophasor applications,
the security gateway software should be hosted on a more
powerful device.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of secure IEC 61850-90-5 for synchropha-
sor communication in power grids is a big challenge
due to interoperability issues with legacy phasor devices.
Most legacy phasor devices use IEEE C37.118.2 which
is highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. Firouzi et al. [7]
recently proposed a solution using an IEEE C37.118.2 to
IEC 61850-90-5 gateway. However, the published gateway
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has limited features to fully address interoperability issues
and also lacks the IEC recommended GDOI security
mechanism. Further, previous work [3] lacks a clear func-
tional specification towards practically implementing GDOI
security mechanism.
To address interoperability, integration as well as com-
munication security issues for synchrophasor-based systems,
this paper presented the design and implementation of a
low cost security gateway. The security gateway supports
two way conversion features between IEEE C37.118.2 and
IEC 61850-90-5 communication frameworks. It is highly
configurable and can be used for different types of PMUs
and PDCs. Further, it ensures communication security using
IEC recommended GDOI security mechanism. The GDOI
provides dynamic security policies and keying material by
periodically replacing old security credentials. This paper
provided clear functional and technical details of GDOI secu-
rity mechanism which can be used as proof of concept for
implementing it in future phasor devices. Further, the GDOI
implementation reported in this paper has been adopted in
OpenPMU [12].
This paper also functionally validated security gateway
features by implementing a Wireshark dissector and per-
formed compliance testing of IEEE C37.118.2 and IEC
61850-90-5 with the PMU Connection Tester. Through
detailed experimental evaluation, this paper validated the
suitability of GDOI security mechanism for constraint
devices such as ARM processor based security gateway.
It was observed that security gateway increases the network
bandwidth requirement for synchrophasor communication
due to using IEC 61850-90-5. However, on most existing
access technologies today, it can easily support PMUs and
PDCs with data transmission rate of up to 720 packets per
second (much higher rate than used in most practical syn-
chrophasor applications). This paper also identified that the
processing latency of security gateway is a critical perfor-
mance limiting factor for synchrophasor applications with
strict latency and data rate requirements. It is experimentally
validated using different PMUs and PDCs that an effective
low cost and compact implementation of the security gate-
way on ARM processor is feasible for most synchrophasor
applications requiring data rate up to 100 packets/second.
For applications requiring very high data transmission rates,
the security gateway could be deployed on a more powerful
device. The result of the presented comprehensive implemen-
tation is to enable new smart grid control applications that
depend on secure and trustworthy real-time synchrophasor
data.
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